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The First Amendment is a local ordinance in cyberspace.
- John Perry Barlow'
[I]f all printers were determined not to print anything till they
were sure it would offend nobody, there would be very little printed.
- Benjamin Franklin 2
"Tom Cruise is gay.' 3  "Paris Hilton is a drug smuggler."
4
Michael Jackson "practices bestiality."5 "Lindsay Lohan is suicidal,
possible lesbian."6  "George W. Bush, Jr. has a cocaine problem."
7
"Britney Spears smokes a joint" and "forces marijuana onto minors."
8
'Mel Gibson hates Jews."9 In the age of the Internet, rumors such as
these spread as fast as high-speed connections can carry them and
may cause widespread injury to a person's reputation. The First
Amendment nearly protects all of this speech. However, thanks to the
Internet and the complex choice of law problems it presents,
publishers of such celebrity gossip may face liability in defamation
actions abroad, where courts often value free speech and expression
considerably less than their American counterparts.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the
freedom of American speech and expression, especially when that
speech is political and related to matters of public concern. In light of
1. Craig E. Cline et al., Digital World '95: It's the Point of View, SEYBOLD REPORT
ON DESKTOP PUBLISHING (Resource Information Systems Inc., Boston, Mass.), vol. 9, issue
11, July 17, 1995, at 3, available at Thomson Gale, doc. no. A17210027.
2. Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for Printers, PA. GAZETTE, June 10, 1731,
reprinted in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN APOLOGY FOR PRINTERS 7 (Randolph Goodman ed.,
Acropolis Books, Ltd. 1973).
3. Jossip.com, Tom Cruise is Gay: Now with Substantially More Fake Evidence,
http://www.jossip.com/gossip/tom-cruise/tom-cruise-is-gay-now-with-substantially-more-
fake-evidence-20050629.php (June 29, 2005).
4. TheSuperficial.com, Nick Carter Says Paris Hilton is a Drug Smuggler,
http://thesuperficial.con/20O6/10/nick-carter-says-paris -hilton.html (Oct. 23, 2006).
5. MoxieGrrrl.com, Michael Jackson is a Freakish Pervert,
http://www.moxiegrrrl.com/2005/06/michael-jackson-is-freakish-pervert.html (June 14,
2005).
6. TheSuperficial.com, Lindsay Lohan is Suicidal, Possible Lesbian,
http://thesuperficial.coml2006/1 llindsayjohanis suicidal-poss.html (Nov. 17, 2006).
7. Adam J. Smith, Governor Bush's Cocaine Problem,
http://www.progress.org/drcl2.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
8. TheSuperficial.com, Britney Spears Smokes a Joint, http://thesuperficial.com
2006/04Tbritney-spears-smokes-ajoint.html (Apr. 25, 2006).
9. Pinkdome.com, Mel Gibson Hates Jews, http://pinkdome.comlarchives/
2006/07/mel-gibson hate.html (July 29, 2006).
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this protection, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a broad
immunity from defamation suits for publishers when the content of
their speech concerns a public figure, including politicians as well as
those in the public eye. 10 To succeed in an American defamation suit,
public figures such as celebrities, pop stars, and other members of the
"glitterati" must prove that false information was published with
"actual malice."" This is a very difficult burden to meet, and most
public figures-if they even choose to file suit-will fail in American
courts. 12
Other nations, however, have much more "plaintiff friendly"
standards for defamatory speech. For example, Australian law, unlike
the broad privilege granted in the United States to publishers of
material about public figures, is "considerably more favorable to the
plaintiff than that of the United States."'1 3 Until recently, how
defamation law was applied "down under" and around the globe was of
little concern for American publishers; when publication occurred in
the United States, foreign courts did not (and could not) exercise
jurisdiction over them. All of this changed, however, when a foreign
court cavalierly exercised a broad jurisdictional reach over an
American publisher. In the recent landmark case of Dow Jones & Co.
v. Gutnick, the Australian High Court exercised jurisdiction over an
American publisher simply because material was accessed "on-line"
from a computer located in Australia.' 4 The Gutnick decision could
sound the death-knell for First Amendment protection in a digitized
world, as smart plaintiffs will begin to file suits in Australian courts,
where they are more likely to succeed.
Celebrity gossip is disseminated on the Internet not only by
profitable publications and Internet tabloids with professional writers
and sophisticated legal teams, but also by countless numbers of
"blogs" posted by ordinary individuals, often with nothing more than a
dial-up connection. Americans posting speech on the Internet must be
10. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11. Id. at 254.
12. See, e.g., Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying
defendant Time's motion for summary judgment and stating that plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing actual malice by "clear and convincing" proof); Spears v. US Weekly, No.
SC087989 (Ca. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/spears/uswklyll0306ord.pdf (holding that it was not defamatory to state that Plaintiff
Britney Spears and her then-husband Kevin Federline taped themselves having sex,
because she had "put her modern sexuality squarely, and profitably, before the public eye").
13. Nathan W. Garnett, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick: Will Australia's Long
Jurisdictional Reach Chill Internet Speech World-Wide?, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 61, 69-
70 (2004).
14. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.).
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aware of the implications of the Gutnick decision and recognize that
they could be dragged into court and held liable for defamation
abroad. This note explores theoretical changes to the law that should
be adopted to protect the First Amendment as it applies to Internet
speech. Additionally, this note discusses various practical tactics that
publishers-both professionals and bloggers alike-may employ to
prevent liability.
I. BACKGROUND
"[T]he press has been making mistakes from its earliest days,
and like any human enterprise, always will."'15 The law of defamation
attempts to provide an outlet for individuals to avenge their
reputation after it has been tarnished by the publication of false
statements. However, defamation law involves a clash of two
important societal values: freedom of speech and freedom to protect
one's own reputation. 16 "The proper balance between these two goals
has been vigorously debated over the years," and different nations
have crafted varying approaches to deal with this tension.' 7
A. Defamation Law in the United States
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press."'8  Defamation law in the United States has struggled to
protect this freedom of speech and press, while protecting individuals
whose reputations may be injured by a false publication.
Defamation law in the United States includes civil actions for
both libel (written words) and slander (spoken words).19 Defamation
provides personal reputational protection for individuals harmed by
the speech of others.20  American defamation jurisprudence is
characterized by two distinct time periods: pre-1964 (the common law)
15. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 10 (1986).
16. Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam, Introduction to THE COST OF LIBEL:
ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, at vii (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds.,
1989).
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 785-87 (W.
Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (noting the distinctions between libel and slander).
20. See id. at 772; Shawn A. Bone, Private Harms in the Cyber-World: The
Conundrum of Choice of Law for Defamation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 279, 285-86 (2005).
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and post-1964, the year of the landmark case New York Times v.
Sullivan.
1. American Common Law: Strict Liability
In the United States, the common law of defamation set the
balance between free speech and reputation firmly in favor of
reputation. 21  Traditionally, American defamation law closely
mirrored English common law.22 The law of defamation was left to
state control, 23 and the prevailing rule reflected a theory of "strict
accountability for the substance of a defamatory statement."24
Publishers were, in effect, "insurers of the reputations of those
affected partly because the press was viewed as a powerful force with
considerable ability to harm innocent persons." 25 Additionally, it was
argued that the press could mitigate the harmful effects of the strict
liability rule by risk spreading and insurance. 26  To succeed in a
defamation suit at common law, a plaintiff needed only to prove:
by a bare preponderance of the evidence (the normal burden of proof in civil, as
opposed to criminal, cases) that the defendant had uttered (or, more commonly,
published) words tending to injure the alleged victim's reputation. The
plaintiff/victim was not required to prove that the defendant/publisher was
negligent or in any other way at fault, and indeed the plaintiff did not even have to
prove that the imputation was false. The defendant could, to be sure, prevent
recovery by asserting an affirmative defense and showing that the words were
true.
27
In other words, the law required the plaintiff to show merely that (1) a
publication or utterance (2) caused (3) injury to his or her reputation.
Under this common law tradition, defamation law was not a subject of
constitutional concern.
28
21. See NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 17 (G. Edward White ed., 1986).
22. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 38 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
23. See, e.g., Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Givens, 67 F.2d 62 (10th Cir. 1933); Walker v. Bee-
News Publ'g Co., 240 N.W. 579 (Neb. 1932); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 596-604 (2d ed. 1955) (providing many additional state cases, leading to the
inference that common law defamation was left entirely to state law).
24. Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 904-05 (1956).
25. Stephen M. Renas et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect: Are
Newspapers Affected by Liability Standards in Defamation Actions?, in THE COST OF LIBEL,
supra note 16, at 41, 44.
26. Id.
27. Schauer, supra note 22, at 38.
28. See SMOLLA, supra note 15, at 25 (indicating that the 1964 Sullivan decision
marked the first time that constitutional restraints were applied to state defamation law).
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2. American Law Today: New York Times v. Sullivan and its Progeny
In 1964, the United States departed dramatically from its
common law tradition. In New York Times v. Sullivan,29 the Supreme
Court "revolutionized the modern law of libel by declaring for the first
time that state libel laws were subject to First Amendment
restraints."30  The Court feared that the traditional common law
approach imposed all risk of falsity upon the publisher, which in turn
made publishers wary of reporting even those charges that were in
fact true.31 Justice Brennan expressed this concern:
[C]ritics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They
tend to make statements which steer far wider of the unlawful zone.
32
This phenomenon, now widely termed "the chilling effect," 33 was, in
the Court's opinion, "inconsistent with a First Amendment[,] part of
whose goal was to encourage exposing and thus checking the abuses of
those in power."34  The Court reasoned that if public officials were
allowed to recover damages for any false and defamatory statement,
regardless of the level of care taken in printing such a story, then
newspapers would be discouraged, or "chilled," from printing stories
on matters of public interest.35 To remove the "chilling effect" of
defamation law, the Court imposed, as a matter of constitutional law,
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct, unless he proves that the
statement was made with "actual malice" - that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
36
The Court held that the police commissioner's case was
"constitutionally insufficient to support a finding" for the plaintiff.37
29. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a detailed description of
the factual background of the Sullivan decision, see ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE
SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
30. SMOLLA, supra note 15, at 25.
31. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
32. Id.
33. See Arielle D. Kane, Note, Sticks and Stones: How Words Can Hurt, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 159, 181 (2001); Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages for
Newsgathering Torts and the Limitations of First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV.
507, 526-27 (1998).
34. Schauer, supra note 22, at 39 (referencing Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., at 521-97 (1977)).
35. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
36. Id. at 279-80.
37. Id. at 292.
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The Sullivan Court acknowledged the idea that "politicians...
must accept the risk of criticism as a consequence of their entry into
public life, but the ordinary citizen should not be held to that risk."
38
As such, the Court created two distinct standards for fault: one for
defamed public officials and one for defamed private individuals. 39
Under Sullivan, a public official must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the material was published with constitutionally defined
"actual malice"; that is, that the defendant published false,
defamatory material with knowledge or reckless disregard of its
falsity.40 Private individuals speaking on private issues, however,
need only show by a mere preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was at fault in publishing the defamatory falsehood 4 ; in
most jurisdictions, this requires a showing of simple negligence. 42
Under this framework, public officials have a much more difficult time
succeeding in a defamation suit.
In the years following Sullivan, the Supreme Court has refused
to back away from its approach, instead choosing to extend it. The
Court has applied the "actual malice" standard to candidates for
public office as well as to office holders 43 and extended the standard to
"[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the
vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are
properly classed as public figures."44 As a result, courts have applied
the rule to pop stars, television chefs, authors, corporate executives,
professional athletes, and other such members of the "glitterati."45
38. ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 208 (2d ed. 2005).
39. See generally BRUCE W. SANFORD, Who Is the Plaintiff? The Public v. Private
Person Determination, in LIBEL AND PRIVACY 7-1 (2d ed. 1991 Supp. 2006). This is
admittedly a simplified version of American defamation law.
40. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
41. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); SMOLLA, supra note 15, at
114.
42. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Hicks, 448 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1983); Brown v. Kelly Broad.
Co., 771 P.2d 406 (Cal.1989); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C.
1980); Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, Mich., 398 N.W.2d 245 (Mich. 1986);
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976).
43. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (though the Court eventually held that the plaintiff, a
prominent Chicago attorney retained in a civil suit against a Chicago policeman, was not a
public figure).
45. See generally Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905
(1984). But see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976) (holding that a wealthy
socialite whose divorce was mischaracterized in Time magazine was not a public figure
because she did not "assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society, other
than perhaps Palm Beach society, and she did not thrust herself to the forefront of any
particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in
it").
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The Sullivan decision undoubtedly changed defamation
doctrine in the United States by bringing the once private law
governing defamatory speech under the ambit of First Amendment
constitutional jurisprudence. 46 The decision also mandated a showing
of "falsity as a constitutional prerequisite to a public figure's recovery
for defamation 47 and introduced drastically different standards of
fault for publishers, depending upon the public status of the defamed
plaintiff. 48 The decision also changed the practice of defamation suits,
as it "effectively ended civil defamation suits by public officials in the
United States."49  Today, "the law of libel involving public [figures]
ha[s] been all but abolished." 50
B. Defamation Law in Australia5i
There is no explicit "freedom of speech" guarantee in the
Australian Constitution.5 2 The freedom, like all civil liberties in
Australia, is recognized and protected by the common law.
Additionally, Australia does not have a uniform national defamation
law. 53 Instead, each of Australia's eight states and territories has its
own defamation law. However, the Australian High Court is the final
arbiter of the common law throughout the country, and need not defer
to a state court to interpret state legislation or the common law.54 As
46. Russell L. Weaver & David F. Partlett, Defamation, Free Speech, and
Democratic Governance, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 57, 66-67 (2005) [hereinafter Weaver &
Partlett, Democratic Governance].
47. Ronald A. Cass, Principles and Interest in Libel Law After New York Times: An
Incentive Analysis, in THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 16, at 70 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
279-80).
48. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269, 279-80.
49. Weaver & Partlett, Democratic Governance, supra note 46, at 66-67.
50. Dennis, supra note 16, at viii.
51. This note focuses on Australian defamation law because it differs in many
crucial aspects from American law and offers an interesting comparative perspective to
American law. Additionally, Australia was the first nation to hold an American publisher
liable for speech published in the United States, simply because of the material's presence
on the Internet. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.). This
broad reach of jurisdiction is unique and carries major implications for American
publishers.
52. See generally COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT (Austl.),
available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/comlaw.nsf/440c1928582lblO9ca256f3a
00ld59b7/57dea3835d797364ca256f9d0078c087/$FILE/ConstitutionAct.pdf.
53. There have been attempts to achieve uniformity. See, e.g., Michael D. Kirby,
"The Purest Treasure?" National Defamation Law Reform in Australia, 8 FED. L. REV. 113,
136 (1977); Sally Walker, The New South Wales Law Reform Commission's Discussion
Paper on Defamation, 2 TORTS L.J. 69, 69 (1994) (Austl.).
54. See Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 562-64 (Austl.).
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a result, the High Court's judicial decisions apply throughout the
nation.
Despite the Sullivan decision in the United States, the
Australian High Court, like most other Commonwealth countries,
"steadfastly clung to the notion that defamation is a necessary
protection lest good people fall to foul rumor."55  There are three
distinctive stages in Australia's defamation law history: the common
law, the era of Theophanous v. Herald & Times Weekly, and the
current era of Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
1. Australian Common Law
In Australia, like in the United States, defamation law
provides separate actions for libel and slander.5 6  Prior to 1994,
Australian defamation law was similar to English and American
common law: publishers of defamatory material were strictly liable for
false statements, regardless of the publisher's knowledge or intent.57
2. Australian Defense of Privilege: Theophanous v. Herald & Times
Weekly
Although the Australian Constitution contains no explicit
protection for free speech, it has been interpreted to contain an
implied protection for political communication. 58  In 1994, in
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times, Australia's High Court relied
upon these implied protections to create a constitutional defense of
"privilege" for defamatory publication of political and governmental
matters. 59 The defense was applicable so long as defendants could
show that: (1) they were unaware that the publications were false; (2)
they had not published recklessly, without caring about truth or
falsity; and (3) publication was reasonable under the circumstances. 60
55. Russell L. Weaver et al., Defamation Law and Free Speech: Reynolds v. Times
Newspapers and the English Media, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1255, 1258 (2004).
56. Ray Watterson, Defamation, in MEDIA LAW IN AUSTRALIA 9, 11 (Mark
Armstrong et al. eds., 3d ed. 1995).
57. Id. at 25.
58. See Australian Capital Television v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 107-
08 (Austl.); Nationwide News v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1, 2 (Austl.). The implication has
been confirmed and expanded in subsequent cases. See Lange, 189 C.L.R. at 556 (Austl.);
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 121 (Austl.).
59. Theophanous, 182 C.L.R. at 140.
60. Id. at 104.
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The exception was strictly limited, however, to publications about
political or government matters. 61
3. Australian Law Today: Lange v. Australian Broadcasting
Corporation
Less than three years later, the High Court, which was divided
in Theophanous, readdressed the issue of qualified privilege in Lange
v. Australian Broadcasting Corp.62 In a unanimous judgment, "the
High Court solidly established the existence of the implied protection
for political communication and refashioned the common law of
defamation to accord with it."63 Per that decision, a defense of
qualified privilege requires that the defendant establish: (1) it had
reasonable grounds to believe the publication was true; (2) it did not
believe the publication was false; and (3) it had made proper inquiries
to verify the publication. 64 In addition, defendants must have sought
and published a response from the potential plaintiff, except when
neither practical nor necessary. 65 Although Lange's qualified privilege
can be defeated by a showing of malice, the court's focus is almost
always on the reasonableness inquiry in the first prong.66
The qualified privilege espoused by Lange is limited to
publication related to the conduct of governmental affairs. 67 The High
Court explicitly refused to accept the American extension of a broad
privilege to all public figures, as such an "extension would reach far
beyond the representative government rationale" that supported a
move away from strict liability for political speech. 68 The Australian
High Court seemed to agree with the proposition that "Sullivan
tilt[ed] the balance too far away from the protection of individual
reputation."69
Subject to limited qualifications, such as those set out by the
High Court in Lange, liability for publication of defamatory material
61. Weaver & Partlett, Democratic Governance, supra note 46, at 69-70.
62. Lange, 189 C.L.R. at 571, 572.
63. Russell L. Weaver & David F. Partlett, Defamation, the Media, and Free
Speech: Australia's Experiment with Expanded Qualified Privilege, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 377, 386 (2004) [hereinafter Weaver & Partlett, Free Speech].
64. See Lange, 189 C.L.R. at 574.
65. Id.
66. Weaver & Partlett, Free Speech, supra note 63, at 386-87.
67. Weaver et al., supra note 55, at 1258.
68. Leonard Leigh, Of Free Speech and Individual Reputation: New York Times v.
Sullivan in Canada and Australia, in IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN, ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN LAW 51, 64 (Ian Loveland ed., 1998).
69. Id.
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in Australia remains strict. It matters not that an author did not
understand that the words were defamatory, did not intend to harm
the plaintiff, or took all reasonable care in checking the material to
avoid defamatory content. 70 However, under Lange, defendants do
enjoy a qualified privilege in publications related to governmental
affairs, so long as they had reasonable grounds to believe the
publication was true, did not believe it was false, and made the proper
inquiries to verify the publication. This qualified privilege is narrowly
restricted to public officials such as elected representatives and
candidates for office, and does not extend to public figures such as
celebrities or pop stars.
C. Cyber-Libel: Defamation and the Internet
Different nations place different premiums on free speech and,
as a result, have varying levels of protection for defamatory speech.
Until recently, disparities in defamation laws made little difference as
"defamation laws, and their application[s], [were] restricted to their
respective counties." 71 This changed, however, with the advent of the
Internet: "As communications technology advanced, the effect of a
statement became more and more widespread, until the Internet gave
communicators the ability to send one line to the entire world
instantaneously."72  "Cyber-libel," defamation claims for material
posted on web-pages, in chat-rooms, or in electronic newspapers, has
complicated defamation jurisprudence. 73
Defamation claims often raise choice of law questions.74 This is
especially true when the defamatory speech is disseminated in several
different nations. Because defamation law "clearly applies to
communications on the Net,"75 the number of claims arising from
multi-national defamation undoubtedly has increased.7 6 Traditional
choice of law principles instruct that a tort dispute is governed by the
law of the locale where the harm occurred.7 7 "In [typical] defamation
cases, 'the place of the wrong' [is] the jurisdiction where the
70. Watterson, supra note 56, at 25.
71. Garnett, supra note 13, at 68.
72. Bone, supra note 20, at 290.
73. See SANFORD, supra note 39, at 13-8.
74. See James R. Pielemeier, Choice of Law for Multistate Defamation - The State
of Affairs as Internet Defamation Beckons, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55, 55 (2003).
75. BARENDT, supra note 38, at 463.
76. Pielemeier, supra note 74, at 111.
77. ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 759 (2d ed. 1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934)).
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defamatory matter was heard or read by a third person, regardless of
the place of broadcasting or writing."78 The Internet is "ubiquitous,
borderless, global and ambient" by nature, however. 79 Both the
United States and Australia have crafted different approaches to
addressing the complicated choice of law concerns raised by such
global defamation actions.
1. American "Choice of Law"
American courts that have addressed the jurisdiction questions
arising from Internet defamation have "exhibit[ed] a general
unwillingness to allow libel plaintiffs to assert personal jurisdiction
over defendants simply based on the ability of individuals in a
plaintiffs own forum to access allegedly defamatory material via the
Internet."80 Most American courts hold that Internet content must be
"expressly targeted at or directed to the forum state" to support
jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction is proper only if the publishers
"manifested an intent to direct their website content" to a particular
jurisdiction's audience.8 1 These courts would not support an exercise
of jurisdiction simply because material was accessible within the
jurisdiction.
2. Australian "Choice of Law:" Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick
While American courts are increasingly unwilling to recognize
personal jurisdiction over defamation defendants based solely on the
ability of individuals in the defendant's forum to access the material
on the Internet, Australian courts have no such qualms. In 2002, the
High Court of Australia issued a landmark decision in Dow Jones &
Co. v. Gutnick.8 2 Gutnick was the subject of an expos6 in Barron's
Online magazine and the Wall Street Journal Online newspaper, both
accessible on the Internet, and claimed that he was defamed by the
article.8 3 Gutnick, a citizen of Australia, filed the suit in Australian
courts.8 4 Dow Jones, an American company and the parent of Barron's
and the Wall Street Journal, contended that the transformation of an
78. Id.
79. Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 616 (Austl.) (Kirby J.,
concurring) (noting that there are more than 650 million people connected by the internet).
80. SANFORD, supra note 73, at 13-8 (citing Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 534-
35 (Minn. 2002)).
81. Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002).




article from print format to electronic format is similar to the
traditional publication of an article.8 5 Because Dow Jones' electronic
conversion sites were located in New Jersey, the defendant argued
that New Jersey was the site of publication and jurisdiction for the
suit was vested in New Jersey courts.8 6
The High Court rejected Dow Jones' argument, relying instead
on Australian common law precedent, which states that the place
where defamatory material is "comprehended" is the place of the
tort.8 7 Rigidly applying this rule to the facts, the Court articulated the
following rule:
In the case of material on the World Wide Web, it is' not available in
comprehensible form until downloaded on to the computer of a person who has
used a web browser to pull the material from the web server. It is where that
person downloads the material that the damage to reputation may be done.
Ordinarily then, that will be the place where the tort of defamation is committed. 88
Though Dow Jones did not aim its allegedly defamatory statements at
Australia,8 9 the court reasoned that "those who post information on
the World Wide Web do so knowing that the information they make
available is available to all and sundry without any geographic
restriction."90  Because the allegedly defamatory statement was
downloaded and viewed in Australia, the High Court held that
jurisdiction was proper in Australia.91
3. Implications of Gutnick
Legal scholars immediately criticized the Australian High
Court's decision in Gutnick, arguing that it "places the Internet's
utility as a form of mass communication at risk."92 It was reasoned
that "the law of the country with the lowest level of speech protection
would become the de facto law of the Internet."93 One critic recognized
the practical implications that the Gutnick decision will have on
Internet communications:
The burden of liability that the Gutnick decision places on an Internet media
defendant will dry up the flow of information distributed via the Internet. A media
entity prepared to place an article on the Internet will have to apprize itself of the
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 586.
88. Id. at 607.
89. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 63-64.
90. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 605.
91. Id. at 605-07.
92. Garnett, supra note 13, at 76.
93. Id. at 68.
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gamut of international defamation law and make a calculated judgment whether or
not to print based on a comparison of that law to the contents of the article. The
effect of that will likely be one of two results: either (1) the media defendant will
forego printing on the Internet because the potential liability is incalculable or (2)
the media defendant will have to go through a screening process that would make
printing on the Internet unwieldy and delay information flow. . . .This self-
censorship will cause a drastic speed bump in the fast lane that is information
exchange on the Internet.
94
Reducing the level of speech protection to that provided by
Australian law95 negates the First Amendment right to speech about
public figures recognized by the Supreme Court in Sullivan and its
progeny, and greatly restricts the ability of the American media to
encourage frank speech on matters of public interest. As Dow Jones'
general counsel predicted, the Gutnick decision has created a "kind of




Before the Internet, publishers could make conscious choices
about where their written material was disseminated. "If the risk of
being sued for defamation was too great in a country, the publisher
could forego selling it there."97 However, the Internet has drastically
changed the landscape of defamation law, especially as foreign courts
begin to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of where material is
downloaded. 98 Today, most published material can be downloaded
anywhere with a click of a mouse, which means that authors may be
subject to liability in various countries following varying standards for
defamation. 99
94. Bone, supra note 20, at 309-10.
95. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 75-76.
96. Matthew Rose, Leading the News: Australia to Hear Web Libel Suit in
Landmark Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at A3.
97. GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY J. MATSUURA, Defamation, in LAW OF THE
INTERNET 8-66.1 (2d ed. 2002 Supp. 2006).
98. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.).
99. See DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 97, at 8-66.1. Of great interest, though
outside the purview of this note, will be the effect of Google's current efforts to digitize
books, creating cyberspace's version of the Library at Alexandria. See Chris Gaither,
Google Puts Book Copying on Hold, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at Cl; Brewster Kahle,
Speech to the Library of Congress as part of the "Digital Future" Series (Dec. 13, 2004),
available at http://www.archive.org/details/cspan-brewsterkahle. As books never
intended for world-wide dissemination suddenly become available for global Internet
download, publishers may find themselves facing multiple defamation suits in foreign
jurisdictions.
CYBER-LIBELING THE GLITPERATI
U.S. defamation law is drastically different from that of foreign
nations, as foreign laws do not provide defendants with the broad
range of protection granted by the First Amendment. As a result, it is
considerably "easier to win defamation judgments in other countries
than in the United States."100 As foreign nations, following Australia's
lead, begin to exercise jurisdiction over American defendants, there is
a significant risk of self-censorship and that American speech will be
chilled as a preventative measure. 10 1 Given the importance of the
First Amendment and free speech in the United States, this is not an
acceptable option. 10 2 Publishers of defamatory material should seek
theoretical changes in the law as well as various practical solutions to
avoid liability in foreign jurisdictions.
A. Theoretical Proposals for Change
Numerous scholars have proposed theoretical changes to
counter the long jurisdictional reach exercised by the Australian High
Court in Gutnick. While the Gutnick decision struck a deep blow
against the First Amendment, some solutions tip the balance too far in
favor of free expression without any consequences. Others, however,
propose solutions that adequately address the complicated choice of
law concerns that arise from celebrity cyber-libel.
1. Eliminate Internet Defamation
Some scholars have argued that defamation law should not
apply to Internet speech, and call for the complete elimination of
cyber-libel altogether. 0 3  These critics argue that any false and
defamatory statement appearing on the Internet can easily be
counteracted by an on-line response, 0 4 and that those participating in
the Internet's free-for-all environment "should have very thick
skins."'0 5 Even if an individual "cannot be deemed to have agreed to
[the Internet's] free-for-all environment solely by communicating on-
line, anyone defamed on-line presumably has access to the same
100. DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 97, at 8-67.
101. See Raymond W. Beauchamp, England's Chilling Forecast: The Case for
Granting Declaratory Relief to Prevent English Defamation Actions from Chilling American
Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3145 (2006).
102. See BARENDT, supra note 38, at 1.
103. See DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 97, at 8-28.5, 8-28.6; Mike Godwin, Libel
Law: Let it Die, WIRED, Mar. 1996, at 116, 118, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.03/letitdie.html.
104. Godwin, supra note 103, at 116, 118.
105. DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 97, at 8-28.5, 8-28.6.
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channels of communication and can defend himself on-line."'10 6 This
opportunity for personal response arguably negates the damages
caused by defamatory speech.
10 7
This proposal inadequately addresses the concerns raised by
cyber-libel today. Eliminating all claims of Internet defamation would
result in harm to individuals who are unable to adequately counteract
posted defamatory statements. The belief that a simple posted
response on the Internet provides an adequate remedy for defamation
is naive.
[E]ven false accusations are often difficult to counteract no matter how widely
disseminated and thoroughly reasoned the response. Furthermore, as anyone who
has logged onto Web sites that espouse unsubstantiated rumors, controversial
positions, or even hatred (for example, white supremacy sites) can attest, it is
highly debatable whether access to on-line communication is an effective channel
for any response, including a response to a false statement. 108
In defamation suits, especially those brought by celebrities, the
victims usually have not entered into voluntary relationships with the
people who libeled them, and may have no knowledge that the
statements were made until the harmful speech has been posted on-
line. Defamatory speech about the glitterati is so quickly and widely
spread on the Internet today that a personal response on a single
Web-page would be virtually ineffective. 10 9 While free speech and
other First Amendment rights are invaluable, the ability of an injured
person to seek adequate redress against her defamer is also
important, and a proposal that requires complete abandonment of that
principle is not a solution at all.
2. Create an Independent Internet Law
Other scholars have argued that because the Internet offers a
unique world of communication, it requires its own independent
106. Id.
107. William B. Turner, What Part of "No Law" Don't you Understand?, WIRED, Mar.
1996, at 104, 110, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.03/no.law.html.
108. DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 97, at 8-28.6.
109. Defamatory statements about celebrities are not simply posted on web-sites by
major news publications such as People or Entertainment Weekly. Instead, the Internet is
saturated with personal "blogs" that disseminate often false statements to a broad
audience. See, e.g, TheSuperficial.com, About the Superficial, www.thesuperficial.com/
about.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (a "celebrity gossip cite which publishes rumors and
conjecture in addition to accurately reported facts," and whose stated goal is to "make fun
of as many people as possible," especially celebrities); PinkIsTheNewBlog,
www.trent.blogspot.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (a popular blog known for posting
"Hearsay & Gossip, Rumor & Fact").
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law. 110 This approach, however, has serious flaws, given the difficulty
of enforcing such rules of conduct among all Internet users."'
Additionally, the chances of a new, independent law granting
Americans the protection afforded by the First Amendment are slim.
Rules or standards that supersede U.S. constitutional jurisprudence
for American citizens are neither acceptable nor enforceable. 1 2
Therefore, this suggestion is not an appropriate solution to the
complicated choice of law questions raised by cyber-libel.
3. Abandon the Gutnick Standard
Numerous critics have argued for the abandonment of the
Gutnick standard, and have proposed varying standards to adopt in
lieu of the High Court's approach.
a. "Location of Servers" Standard
Geoffrey Robertson, the attorney for Dow Jones in Gutnick,
argued that "the publisher of material on the World Wide Web be able
to govern its conduct according only to the law of the place where it
maintained its web servers."11 3 Adoption of this "location of servers"
standard protects freedom of expression by limiting liability in foreign
jurisdictions. Publishers would no longer be subject to liability in any
nation where the Internet is accessible.
This approach is seriously flawed, however. "As the Australian
High Court noted, this is a vague rule that presents problems of
interpretation,"'' 14 especially in the computer age where publishers
often have servers in dozens of jurisdictions. Additionally, the rule
fails to provide plaintiffs with an opportunity to bring suit where the
most reputational harm usually occurs-their country of residence.
This standard also creates a giant loophole for publishers who
have engaged in the recent trend of "territorial succession."'1 5 Take
for instance HavenCo. Ltd., an Internet start-up that built its servers
on the small island of Sealand. Originally a man-made military base
about three miles off the coast of the British Isles, Sealand was
110. Bone, supra note 20, at 315-16.
111. Id. at 317-18.
112. See supra Part III.A.1.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Garnett, supra note 13, at 87 (citing Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 310
C.L.R. 575 (Austl.)).
115. See Richard Ford, Against Cyberspace, in THE PLACE OF LAw 147 (Austin Sarat
et al. eds., 2003).
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privately purchased in the late 1960's and proclaimed a sovereign
nation.116 Today, Sealand boasts particularly lax laws: "there are no
direct reporting or registration requirements," making it "ideal for
[W]eb business."117 HavenCo. is self-described as a "place for secure e-
Commerce, privacy-protected Internet services and uncensorable free
speech."118  Sealand offers no remedy for reputational injury as a
result of cyber-libel, and therefore, under a "location of servers"
standard, any publisher utilizing HavenCo.'s services would
completely escape liability.
The "location of servers" standard is inherently flawed because
publishers that utilize servers located in nations with lax (or
nonexistent) defamation laws would be free to publish malicious false
statements at will, with zero legal consequence. While the Gutnick
standard destroys the protection afforded to public figures by the First
Amendment, this "location of servers" standard presents the opposite
problem of allowing publishers to completely avoid the legal
consequences of cyber-libel.
b. "Minimum Contacts" Standard
The U.S. Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones articulated an
effects test for resolving choice of law questions. 19  This test
maintains that if a defendant directs his tortious activities at a
resident of another state, causing harm, the majority of which he
knows will be suffered in that state, he has established "minimum
contacts," and courts in that forum state can exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant.' 20 Though Calder v. Jones dealt with a non-Internet
publication, some scholars urge international adoption of this
standard for cyber-libel, 12' arguing for the following rule: "an action
based on material placed on the Internet outside of Australian borders
116. The Principality of Sealand, http://www.sealandgov.org/history.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2007).
117. HavenCo., The Free World Just Milliseconds Away, http://www.havenco.coml
index.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
118. HavenCo., Products and Services, http://www.havenco.comlproducts-
andservices/index.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (emphasis added).
119. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984). In Calder, the National Enquirer,
a Florida corporation, its publisher and a reporter were sued in California. Id. The
National Enquirer is a tabloid newspaper circulated nationwide, but California is its
largest market, accounting for about twelve percent of the copies sold. Id. at 785. The
court held that the Defendant purposely performed an action that it knew would have a
significant impact in California; this was sufficient contact with the forum for the Court to
assert jurisdiction. Id. at 789-90.
120. Id. at 788-90.
121. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13, at 87.
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may only be commenced where the publisher has sufficient contacts
with the forum or has taken affirmative steps to target the forum.
'122
This analysis, while sufficient to address traditional choice of
law questions, has serious flaws in the realm of cyber-libel. Initially,
the nature of the Internet is such that individuals who utilize it for
communication simply put their speech on the Web without directing
it to any specific locale. Especially in the instance of blogs, where
content is free, 123 one can hardly argue that speech is being directed at
any particular jurisdiction. The only contact the publisher maintains
is where his servers are located. As a result, in many instances of
celebrity cyber-libel, the "minimum contacts" standard will be the
same as in the "location of servers" standard.124 Thus, like the
"location of servers" standard, the "minimum contacts" standard does
not remedy the problems raised by cyber-libel.
c. "Situs of Harm" Standard
In his concurrence to the Gutnick decision, Justice Michael
Kirby suggested applying a traditional conflict of laws analysis to
cyber-libel, using a "place of residence" standard to choose the
applicable law. 125  According to Justice Kirby, a publisher is
"constructively aware that the place of residence of the defamed
person" is the center of reputational harm, and therefore jurisdiction
is proper there.' 26 This standard, however, fails to take into account
that harm caused by Internet defamation of celebrities can, in some
instances, be centered outside of the person's home jurisdiction. 12
7
122. Id.
123. See Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional
Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1448 n.3 (2006)
(noting that "blog sites offer free space and user-friendly features").
124. See supra Part III.A.3.a.
125. Bone, supra note 20, at 306.
126. Id.
127. For example, consider the much publicized case of glitterati star Madonna's
recent adoption of a Malawian child. Numerous Websites and blogs have recently termed
her actions "controversial," "exploit[ative]" and "shameful." See, e.g., Madonna Calls
Adoption Scrutiny "Depressing", MSNBC DATELINE, Oct. 31, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15502754/; Mary Mitchell, Madonna's Adoption, CHI. SUN
TIMES Oct. 26, 2006, http:/fblogs.suntimes.conimitchell/2006/10/madonnas-
adoptionl.html; Rachel's Tavern, Random Thoughts #1 (Country Music Conservatives,
Madonna Adoption, and Caffeine), http://www.rachelstavern.com?p=228 (Oct. 16, 2006,
20:22). Madonna, a citizen of the United States, currently resides in Wilshire, England
with her family. See Daniela Deane, Madonna Speaks Out on Adoption, WASH. POST Oct.
26, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/25/
AR2006102501243.html. However, the majority of her career, both in music and film, is
centered in the United States. See Wikipedia.org, Madonna (Entertainer),
2007]
916 VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 9:3:897
In response to this critique, one scholar has proposed a "situs of
harm" standard that modifies Justice Kirby's approach by focusing on
where the harm to a plaintiffs reputation is centered.128 This
standard consists of a two part inquiry:
First, the [court] will determine the place of domicile of the plaintiff at the time
when the defamatory statement was published, and this home location's law will
be the presumptive law for the action for damages. Then both the plaintiff and the
defendant should be provided with the opportunity to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the reputation of the plaintiff was "centered" in a
[different] jurisdiction. 
129
While this test creates a presumption that the plaintiffs place of
residence will be the place of greatest reputational harm, it allows
both parties to prove that the harm occurred elsewhere. This will
assure that the "law governing [a] defamation dispute coincides with
the purposes of defamation law, namely to provide the plaintiff with a
recovery for the harm that has been done to him or her in the eyes of
the community in which he or she associates.
130
This test most effectively addresses the choice of law concerns
that arise from Internet defamation of the glitterati. Publishers of
defamatory material, both professionals and bloggers, can determine
the place of residence of those about whom they wish to write. The
place where the greatest reputational harm will occur will often be
clear as well.131 Thus, a "situs of harm" standard best addresses the
complicated choice of law concerns raised by international cyber-libel
claims, as it best reconciles the tension between personal protection
for defamed individuals and freedom for publishers to speak freely and
anticipate possible litigation.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madonna_%28entertainer%29 (last visited Mar. 13, 2007)
(detailing the star's American based music and film career). If she wished to bring suit, the
"place of residence" standard would ignore that the majority of harm done by defamatory
publications would be in the United States.
128. Bone, supra note 20, at 332-34.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. For example, it should be clear to any person posting material on the Internet
that defamatory statements about celebrity Reese Witherspoon, including her highly
publicized divorce from actor Ryan Phillippe, will cause the greatest reputational harm in
the United States. See Wikipedia.org, Reese Witherspoon, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
Reese_- Witherspoon (last visited Mar. 13, 2007) (describing that the American actress'
family, home and career is in the United States). This is because the U.S. is not only her
place of residence, but the place where her entire career as a Hollywood starlet is based.
See id. Even if Ms. Witherspoon was temporarily residing abroad (for example, to film a
movie or escape the paparazzi), clear evidence would show that her greatest reputational
harm occurred within the United States and jurisdiction would be proper there.
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4. Dispute Resolution in an International Arbitration Forum
Some scholars have suggested that "an international
arbitration forum is the best solution for future Gutnick cases."" 
2
Such a forum will provide unity in implementing a global standard for
determining choice of law in cyber-libel cases. Drawing parallels to
the World Intellectual Property Organization arbitration panel,
133
scholars argue that a "supranational solution [is] necessary,
combining the rights of nations to protect their citizens from ... harm
with the need to have a universal, not a balkanized, Internet."'
134
It is suggested that such an international arbitration forum
panel, consisting of both defamation law experts and practitioners,
have two primary purposes.' 35 First, the panel should decide if the
allegedly defamatory statements are actually true or false. If the
statement is determined to be true, the charge will be dismissed, as
truth is an absolute defense to defamation liability.' 36 If determined
to be false, the plaintiff will be presented with a choice of remedy:
If the plaintiff opts to pursue a nontraditional retraction remedy, the panel will be
given the power to . . . order [a media defendant] to retract the defamatory
statements. If the plaintiff opts to pursue damages [in a domestic court], however,
the panel will make a binding determination of the law governing the dispute,
leaving the plaintiffs ability to recover damages to the substantive provisions of
that law.
137
If a plaintiff chooses to pursue damages, the arbitration forum will
make a binding determination of which nation's law should be applied.
As already discussed, a "situs of harm" standard is the best solution to
addressing the choice of law concerns raised by a cyber-libel suit,1
3s
and therefore should be the standard adopted by such an international
defamation arbitration forum.
132. Bone, supra note 20, at 315.
133. The World Intellectual Property Organization arbitration panel was created to
remedy a situation where the Internet was allowing persons to infringe upon the rights of
businesses protected under geographically centered trademark rights. See id. at 319-24.
The arbitration forum has "gone a long way towards uniform regulation of trademark
infringement on the Internet." Id. at 322.
134. Id. at 321-22.
135. Id. at 325.
136. Id.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. See supra Part III.A.3.C.
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B. Practical Solutions for Protection from Liability
While possibly effective in addressing the problems raised by
cyber-libel of celebrities, none of the previously discussed theoretical
solutions will be of much practical assistance to a publisher
attempting to protect himself from present liability. Though such a
form is probably the best solution for resolution of cyber-libel suits, it
does not yet exist. Moreover, the creation of an arbitration forum will
take time, energy, and acceptance. Therefore, publishers of material
on the Internet must consider concrete, feasible solutions to protect
themselves today.
1. Silencing Speech
Logically, it makes sense that the best way to avoid liability for
defamation is to keep one's (metaphorical) mouth shut. However,
suggesting that publishers chill their speech, especially regarding
public figures, is contrary to the spirit of the First Amendment and
American freedom of expression. Abandoning free speech is an
unacceptable option, and is not a feasible solution for publishers to
consider. 139
2. Education in Lowest-Common Denominator Law
Traditionally, knowledge of the particular defamation law
governing the country in which a book or newspaper was published
was sufficient protection to avoid defamation suits.' 40 However, in
today's legal landscape-marked by Internet publications and
uncertainty over which law will be applied to a publisher-a simple
"knowledge is the best offense" approach to avoiding defamation
liability is no longer practical. Such a defense would require a
publisher to be well-versed in the defamation law of every nation in
the world. Once armed with knowledge of the world's approach to
defamation, a publisher would be required to abandon the First
Amendment and follow the law of the nation with the most stringent
restrictions on speech. As already discussed, such an abandonment of
American free speech is highly objectionable. 14 1
139. BARENDT, supra note 38, at 1.
140. PAUL P. ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY: LEGAL LIMITS IN PUBLISHING, RADIO AND
TELEVISION 7-8 (4th ed. 1970).
141. BARENDT, supra note 38, at 1.
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3. Declaratory Judgments
In the face of international defamation litigation, American
defendants may find a source of relief in American courts. The
Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA)142 is a procedural device that allows
a party to seek a declaration of 'rights and other legal relations'
between parties without seeking any coercive relief against the
defendant."143  In determining whether declaratory relief is
appropriate, a district court must first determine whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction, which includes both typical subject matter
jurisdiction 144 and a determination of whether there is an actual
controversy. 145 Once a court has found that jurisdiction is proper, it
may elect at its discretion whether or not to hear the case.146
One consideration that may "militate against a court exercising
its discretion is the availability of other remedies.1' 47 Additionally,
courts are less likely to grant declaratory relief when there is evidence
that the plaintiff "forum shopped" by bringing her declaratory relief
action solely "to get a more advantageous forum and in anticipation of
an action filed by the opposing party."1 48 A final factor a court will
consider in determining whether to exercise discretion is comity,
which "takes on particular importance when considering DJA actions
in the international context."' 49  The "comity of nations" doctrine
mandates that American courts heed and enforce the judgments of
foreign nations as part of a greater effort to maintain peaceful
relations.' 50 International comity
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
143. Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3091.
144. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, a court must find either federal question
or diversity jurisdiction.
145. In DJA actions, for a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction, there is
an additional requirement that the matter present an "actual controversy." Id. § 2201.
When faced with an action seeking declaratory relief, a district court "must determine
whether the issue is 'an abstract, hypothetical or academic question' or 'a real and
substantial controversy."' Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3095-96. It should be noted that,
"[a]lthough not statutorily prohibited, federal courts have been reluctant to resolve
constitutional controversies by means of declaratory judgments. In many instances, such
relief has been denied on grounds the need for it was 'remote' or 'speculative."' Russell L.
Weaver et al., Declaratory Judgments, in MODERN REMEDIES: CASES, PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES 510, 552 (1997).
146. Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3095, 3099; see 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
147. Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3100.
148. Id. at 3100-01.
149. Id. at 3101.
150. See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Valid Judgment of Court of Foreign
Country as Entitled to Extraterritorial Effect in Federal District Court, 13 A.L.R. FED. 208
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is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another man,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
15 1
Because American courts are not required to give extraterritorial
effects to foreign judgments,' 52 the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that
comity "does not require, but rather forbids [recognition], where such
a recognition works a direct violation of the policy of our laws, and
does violence to what we deem the rights of our citizens."' 53
If an American court grants a motion for declaratory judgment,
then it "shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree
and shall be reviewable as such" within the United States. 54 While
foreign courts may consider such a judgment, they are not required to
heed the rulings of American courts. 155 As a result, American courts
have exhibited hesitation in their exercise of discretion to grant
declaratory relief. 5
6
a. Declaratory Relief Following a Foreign Judgment
American courts will not automatically enforce the judgment of
a foreign court.' 57  Instead, foreign parties must file suit in an
American court to seek enforcement of a foreign judgment. 158 At that
time, the American court will determine whether the foreign judgment
violates American public policy and fundamental notions of justice. 159
§ 4 (1972 & Supp. 2005) (listing cases where comity has been the reason for granting
extraterritorial effect to foreign judgments).
151. Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3101-02.
152. The United States Constitution requires that full faith and credit be given to
judgments of sister states, territories, and possessions of the United States. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). However, the full faith and credit requirement
does not apply to judgments rendered by foreign courts. The extent to which such foreign
judicial decrees are recognized is a matter of choice and discretion, governed by the "comity
of nations" doctrine. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895); Yahoo!, Inc. v. LaLigue
Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme (Yahoo! 1), 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Ca.
2001).
153. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 193 (quoting De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 F. Cas. 309
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873)).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Because declaratory judgments are final, principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel will apply. See Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3102.
155. Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3102.
156. See, e.g., Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113.
157. See, e.g., id.; Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et lAntisemitisme
(Yahoo! I), 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 481 cmt. g (1986).
159. Id. § 482 cmt. f.
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If it does, it will not be enforced. 160 Because the United States' broad
protection of First Amendment speech is not paralleled by foreign
nations, foreign defamation judgments will often infringe upon the
First Amendment rights of American defendants. When a foreign
judgment prima facie infringes on an American defendant's First
Amendment rights, declaratory relief should be granted. 161
Such post-judgment relief is not without its flaws, however.
Litigants are still faced with the often-cumbersome costs of defending
litigation abroad. Additionally, while a judgment may be nullified on
American soil, it will still stand in the foreign nation, and any assets
held there may be seized to fulfill a monetary award. 162 Furthermore,
the defendant publication may no longer be allowed to conduct
business with members of the foreign nation. If criminal sanctions are
imposed (as is often allowed in foreign defamation cases), the
defendant or its representatives may still be detained in accordance
with foreign law. Finally, the issuance of a foreign judgment by an
American court could project a cavalier attitude of superiority, and
disrupt foreign dealings between the United States and other nations.
Therefore, declaratory relief following a foreign judgment is not an
ideal solution for defendants to seek.
b. Declaratory Relief before a Foreign Judgment
Courts often dismiss general claims for declaratory relief prior
to foreign judgments on the grounds that there is no actual
160. Id. § 482(2) ("A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the
court of a foreign state if: . . . (d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or
the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the State
where recognition is sought."). See also id. § 482 cmt. f ("Courts will not recognize or
enforce foreign judgments based on claims perceived to be contrary to fundamental notions
of decency and justice.").
161. "Before dismissing this principle as American arrogance, it should be noted that
U.S. courts are not alone in their efforts to export the laws of their home country. For
example, German courts have not enforced U.S. monetary judgments that far exceed the
German norm." DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 97, at 8-68 (citing Gertried Fischer,
Recognition and Enforcement of American Tort Judgments in Germany, 68 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 199 (1994)).
162. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (stating that "[e]very
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 443 (1987) (stating that, "[1]n the absence of a treaty ... courts in the
United States will generally refrain from examining the validity of a taking by a foreign
state of property within its own territory").
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controversy. 163 The reluctance to find actual controversy may stem
from deeper concerns over whether a judgment by an American court
will be regarded by a foreign court.164 While one American court took
a skeptical view and questioned whether foreign nations would accord
any recognition to a preemptive declaration of rights by American
courts, 165 another court in the same circuit observed that there is no
reason to believe that a foreign court would question an American
ruling, especially when the central events leading to the dispute took
place within the United States. 66 While foreign courts may be
"reluctant to give effect to any injunctions purporting to restrain their
own citizens and transactions,"'' 67 those courts will likely take "less
umbrage with U.S. courts [exercising] jurisdiction of cases that
naturally fit in a U.S. forum.' 1
68
Additionally, a declaration by American courts would "not
affect or purport to interpret [a] foreign court's laws"; rather, it would
only "impact and interpret U.S. legal rights.' 1 69 Finally, foreign courts
should recognize that a declaratory judgment issued prior to a foreign
judgment is in the interest of judicial efficiency, as it indicates that an
American court would most likely refuse to uphold a foreign judgment
against the defendant. For all of these reasons, American courts
should not allow their determination of whether an actual controversy
is present to be clouded by the possibility that a declaratory judgment
would be disregarded by foreign courts.
There are several unique attributes of cyber-libel suits that
should lead a court to conclude that there is an actual controversy,
even before a final judgment. Initially, the danger of a chilling effect
is "inherent in defamation laws . . . [and] can manifest long before
there is a judgment for damages."'170 Additionally, if defamatory
material remains posted on the Internet prior to a judgment, damages
will continue to accrue.' 71 A refusal by American courts to intervene
"may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally
163. See, e.g., Yahoo! II, 433 F.3d 1199; Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods (Harrods), 237
F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Basic v. Fitzroy Engineering, Ltd., 949 F. Supp. 1333
(N.D. Ill. 1996).
164. Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3145.
165. See, e.g., Harrods, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 413.
166. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. EgyptAir (In re Air Crash near Nantucket Island, Mass.,
on Oct. 31, 1999), 392 F. Supp. 2d 461, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
167. Harrods, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (citing ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 51, at 183 (1962)).
168. Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3142.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 3139.
171. Id. at 3140.
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flouting [the] law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be
constitutionally protected activity."'172 This uncertainty over future
damages and the state of legal rights is exactly the type of "actual
controversy" for which declaratory judgments were created. 173
Therefore, courts should find that actual controversy exists in Internet
defamation suits, even prior to a foreign judgment, and should grant
declaratory judgments for American publishers facing litigation. 174
4. Internet Protocol Filtering
Publishers, both professionals and bloggers, may utilize
Internet Protocol (IP) filtering to ensure that their material is viewed
only in nations with acceptable legal standards for free expression and
speech. IP filtering is ideal for Webpages containing "sensitive
content which can/cannot be seen by visitors of specific countries."'175
Each computer that is connected to the Internet is assigned a unique
IP address, made of a combination of numbers. 176 Addresses are
assigned in blocks of numbers per country. 77 Therefore, by viewing
particular IP addresses, it is possible to determine the country from
which each user is viewing the Internet.'78
Internet protocol filtering allows on-line publishers to restrict
who views their Website by country. 79 This is a relatively easy
process by which a publisher determines which countries to accept or
block, and then simply places a short html code in their web pages.'80
When individual browsers visit a webpage, their country settings are
172. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
173. See Martin H. Redish, Considerations in Exercising Discretion, in MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 57.42[1] (2006) (stating that the remedy "is appropriate when
a declaratory judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal
relations in issue, and terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and
controversy giving rise to the proceeding"); Martin H. Redish, Nature and Purpose of
Declaratory Relief, in MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 57.04[3] (2006) (stating that
the declaratory judgment remedy "permits parties to minimize the accrual of avoidable
losses and damages").
174. Beauchamp, supra note 101, at 3141.
175. TrafficCleaner.com, What is IP Filtering and How it Works?,
http://www.trafficcleaner.com/index.php?data [action] f=footer&data [action] O=howitworks





180. See A.P. Lawrence, Web Site IP Filtering, available at
www.webpronews.comexpertarticles/expertarticles/wpn-62-20051208websiteIP
Filtering.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
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checked based on their IP addresses.181  If a visitor's country is
allowed, the page will load and the visitor may browse the site per
usual.18 2 However, if a country is not allowed, the visitor will be re-
routed to an alternative site of the publisher's choosing.18 3 Visitors
will not notice any abnormal browsing experience, and will not be
aware that they are viewing different material based on their
country. 1
8 4
Because publishers can set up an unlimited number of filters-
directing different users to multiple alternate sites-they may provide
different content to viewers from different countries.18 5 This allows
publishers to post varying content for different nations, depending on
the level of speech protection in each. Thus, regardless of the choice of
law standard applied by a foreign court, a publisher can ensure that
they will not face defamation claims abroad. Because IP filtering is
currently free, publishers need not worry about any prohibitive costs
for this service.1 86 Such filtering may be utilized by both professional
on-line publications as well as individual blogs. Because of a filter's
ability to cost-effectively and easily allow speech to be published to
Americans, but not disseminated to nations with undesirable
defamation laws, it is the best way for publishers to avoid foreign
liability.
III. CONCLUSION
In 2005, 4.7 million Australians had Internet access in their
homes.18 7 As personal computers and Internet access become more
affordable, that number will only increase. As it does, the potential
for suits in Australian courts against foreign defendants by members
of the glitterati, defamed in on-line publications, will increase as well.
Australian defamation law, dramatically less protective of
speech than its American counterpart, should now be of great interest
181. TrafficCleaner.com, What is IP Filtering and How it Works?, supra note 175.
182. Id.
183. TrafficCleaner.com, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.trafficcleaner.com/index.php?data[action] f=footer&data[action] f=faq (last
visited Feb. 8, 2007).
184. TrafficCleaner.com, What is IP Filtering and How it Works?, supra note 175.
185. TrafficCleaner.com, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 183.
186. TrafficCleaner is one service that currently offers free IP filtering. See
www.trafficcleaner.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
187. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Household Use of Information Technology,
Australia, 2005-06, http://www.abs.gov.aulAusstats/abs@.nsf/lookupMF/ACC2D18CC958
BC7BCA2568A9001393AE (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
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to American publishers.188 In the wake of Gutnick, the Australian
High Court has started exercising jurisdiction over American
defendants simply because their publications were accessed on-line in
Australia. 8 9 The current problem is not with Australian defamation
law per se.
Australia is of course free to adopt whatever rules it feels are necessary for the
protection of the reputation of its people. However, in the way that it has done so,
Australia has expanded its jurisdictional boundaries such that its rules infringe on
the ability of other countries to protect their own citizens. There is no problem if
Australia wants to apply [its defamation laws] within its own borders, but when it
attempts to control the speech in other countries, we should all be concerned. 190
The concern with Australian law, which should be shared by both
scholars and publishers, is with the country's broad exercise of
jurisdiction over American defendants, causing the elimination of
First Amendment free speech rights on the Internet.' 91
Publishers and scholars should lobby for theoretical changes to
help correct the problems raised by the Australian High Court in
Gutnick. 92 The ideal result is the complete abandonment of the
Gutnick standard, and its replacement by a "situs of harm"
standard."'193 Alternately, however, the more realistic proposal is the
creation of an international arbitration forum to address Internet
defamation claims. 94 If plaintiffs choose to pursue relief beyond
simply the removal of the material, the forum will make a binding
determination of law, following the "situs of harm" standard. This
would effectively limit the reach of the Australian High Court,
restoring the First Amendment rights for cases in which publications
were written in the United States, published in the United States, and
caused the greatest amount of harm in the United States.
As theoretical change will almost surely take considerable
time, publishers may employ various practical solutions to protect
themselves now from foreign liability. 95 Publishers already facing
liability may seek declaratory judgments from American courts. 196
While such relief following a foreign judgment is not ideal for
publishers given high costs of litigation and tensions of international
188. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
189. See supra Part II.C.2.
190. Garnett, supra note 13, at 88.
191. See supra Part II.C.3.
192. See supra Part III.A.
193. See supra Part III.A.3.c.
194. See supra Part III.A.4.
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. See supra Part III.B.3.
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comity, such relief before a foreign judgment issues is much more
effective. However, while courts should find an actual controversy in
such cases and grant a declaratory judgment, there is often a
reluctance to do so stemming from questions of global recognition.
Therefore, publishers should not rely on declaratory judgments as
absolute protection from foreign liability for American publications.
The most effective tool American Internet publishers can
employ is the use of IP filtering. 197 Both professional publishers and
individual bloggers can utilize affordable software that effectively
blocks the viewing of their site in certain nations. Publishers that are
educated in the defamation law of other nations will have better
control over where and under what law they could face liability. If
material cannot be read and accessed in Australia, then the
Australian High Court will no longer be in the position to exercise
jurisdiction over American defendants.
By implementing change, both in the form of new theoretical
approaches to cyber-libel as well as practical safeguards for speech,
American publishers of on-line material may once again enjoy First
Amendment protection for their speech. Unfortunately for the
glitterati, the gossip and rumors written about public figures may
continue to entertain and delight Internet users across the country.
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